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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of the formation
of the uplink tree structure among the mobile multi-hop relay
(MMR) network’s base station (MMR-BS) and its different relay
stations (RSs). We model the problem as a network formation
game in which the RSs want to form a directed tree graph to
improve their utility in terms of the Packet Success Rate (PSR)
by using multi-hop cooperative transmission while accounting for
a link maintenance cost. In this game, the relay stations engage
in bilateral negotiations which result in a contractual agreement
to form a directed link between each pair. For network dynamics,
we propose a myopic algorithm based on the local best responses
of the RSs that converges to a local Nash network. Moreover,
the proposed dynamics algorithm allows the RSs to autonomously
adapt the network topology to changes in the environment due to
mobility or to the presence of heterogeneous traffic. Simulations
results show how the RSs can self-organize in a tree structure
while improving the network’s overall PSR up to 17.5% and 15.6%
compared, respectively, to the cases where no RSs exist and where
the RSs are directly connected to the MMR-BS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spatial diversity has proven to be an effective technique for
mitigating the fading effects of the wireless channel. Through
relaying, mobile nodes cooperate with a given source node in
the transmission of its information to a particular destination
allowing the source node to benefit from spatial diversity gains.
This class of cooperating nodes is referred to as cooperative
communications [1] where multiple nodes cooperate to form a
virtual multiple antenna array. It has been shown that by using
one or multiple relays [1–3] a significant improvement can be
witnessed in terms of Bit Error Rate (BER), outage probability
and other QoS parameters. For this purpose, the incorporation
of cooperative transmission in wireless network standards such
as cellular or broadband networks has been under thorough
investigation recently. For instance, the IEEE 802.16j Mobile
Multi-hop Relay (MMR) task group introduced the concept of
multi-hop relaying in the IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN (WiMAX)
family of broadband networks [4]. In 802.16j, a new node, known
as the Relay Station (RS) is introduced in the network for the
purpose of enhancing capacity and coverage through multi-hop
relaying.
The introduction of the RS yields several performance im-
provements but also faces various challenges. Existing literature
tackles several issues related to MMR networks. On one hand,
the authors in [5] study the possibility of selecting an optimal
position of one RS, which maximizes the total rate, in the
presence of one or multiple subscriber stations for the downlink.
On the other hand, the work done in [6] investigates the MMR
network planning problem with the main aim to find the optimal
locations of the MMR-BSs and the RSs for the full deployment
of an 802.16j network with minimal monetary costs. The work
in [7] provides an algorithm for selecting the optimal downlink
path from the MMR-BS to an MS through one or several RS
based on a maxi-min throughput criterion. Nevertheless, one
promising area in the context of 802.16j networks, which remains
an open problem is the formation of the tree structure connecting
the MMR-BS to the RSs in its coverage area [4]. In general,
the tree can either be formed at the level of the MMR-BS
(centralized approach) or as a result of individual decisions of
the RS (distributed approach) [4], [8]. To our knowledge, few
existing work has tackled the tree formation problem. The main
existing work is done in [8] through a centralized approach that
accounts for the link quality between the RSs. Nevertheless, [8]
does not account for cooperative transmission on the physical
layer. In addition, a centralized approach can yield significant
communication overhead, notably in large scale networks with a
rapidly changing environment due to RS mobility or incoming
heterogeneous traffic.
The main contribution of this paper is to derive a distributed
tree formation algorithm for the uplink of an MMR network
while accounting for multi-hop cooperative transmission. We
model the problem as a network formation game among the RSs.
The utility of each RS accounts for the QoS in terms of Packet
Success Rate (PSR) as well as the costs for link maintenance.
Moreover, we derive a myopic dynamics algorithm for network
formation based on local best response strategies of the RSs.
In the proposed dynamics, each pair of RSs engage in bilateral
negotiations for forming a directed link that can improve the
utility of both the initiating and accepting nodes. The dynamics
algorithm allows the RSs to self-organize into a local Nash
network tree structure rooted at the MMR-BS. Finally, we show
how the RSs can autonomously self-organize in order to cope
with changes in the environment due to mobility or the presence
of heterogeneous data traffic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model and the game formulation. Section
III exposes the properties of the network formation game and
presents the proposed dynamics algorithm. Simulation results are
presented and analyzed in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Model and Game Formulation
Consider the uplink of an MMR network with M RSs and one
MMR-BS (referred to as BS hereafter). The goal is to propose
a distributed algorithm for forming the tree encompassing the
BS and all the RSs. Once the uplink tree is formed, the mobile
stations (MSs) can connect to the network by selecting a serving
RS (or by connecting directly to the BS). We assume that
each MS deposits its packets at the serving RS through direct
transmission. Subsequently, the serving RS acts as a source node
and transmits the packets of the MS to the BS through one or
multiple hops using cooperative transmission. This assumption
on the MSs is considered in order to restrict our attention to
the tree formation problem among the RSs which belong to
a single WiMAX operator. By doing so, we can propose an
algorithm that can be easily integrated within a new or an
existing WiMAX network without relying on external entities
such as the MSs. For the transmission between each RS and the
BS we adopt the decoded relaying multi-hop diversity channel
of [3]. In this model, each intermediate node on the path
between a transmitting RS and the BS combines, encodes and re-
encodes the received signal from all preceding terminals before
relaying (decode-and-forward). Formally, each RS i will receive
Ti packets from all connected MSs, and is required to transmit
these packets to the BS through multi-hop relaying along the
tree. We also denote by Ri the packets received by RS i from
connected RSs for relaying purposes. In addition, we assume
that all the RSs will continuously transmit one packet, known
as a “HELLO” packet in order to maintain their links to the BS
active during periods of no activity, i.e., in the absence of MSs.
An illustrative example of this system model is shown in Fig. 1.
For modeling the distributed formation of an uplink tree
such as in Fig. 1, network formation games provide a suitable
framework [9–12]. These games study the interactions among
multiple players that want to form a network graph. Each player
is considered as a decision maker, and through the various
communications among these decision makers a final graph G
can form. We model the uplink tree formation problem among
the RSs as a network formation game with the RSs being the
players. The result of this game is a directed graph G(V, E)
formed from V = {1, . . . , M} vertices corresponding to the
M RSs and E edges or links. Each link between two RSs
i and j denoted ij ∈ E is a directed connection that goes
from RS i to RS j representing the communication flow in
the uplink from i to j. Each pair of RSs i and j engage in
bilateral negotiations, where RS i suggests to form a link with
j, and RS j has the opportunity to either accept or reject the
offer. If RS j accepts the proposition of i, a contract is formed
between i and j corresponding to the directed link ij. We assume
that the BS accepts any connection from any RS, and thus it is
considered as an additional fixed vertex in any network graph
G. This assumption is motivated by the fact that the WiMAX
operator deploys the RSs in order to enhance the performance of
the BS and thus, the BS should be able to serve all the deployed
RSs. Therefore, in addition to the other RSs, a RS can also
negotiate a contract with the BS. The strategy space of each
RS is further detailed in Section III. Additionally, we define the
notion of path as follows.
Definition 1: A path between two nodes i and j in the graph
G is defined as a sequence of nodes i1, . . . , iK such that i1 =
i, iK = j and each directed link ikik+1 ∈ G for each k ∈
{1, . . . , K − 1}. We denote the set Qi as the set of all paths
from node i to the BS, and thus |Qi| represents the number of
paths from node i to the BS.
Each RS extracts a positive utility from the packets success-
Fig. 1. Example of the uplink tree model.
fully transmitted to the BS out of the Ti packets received from
external MSs, while accounting for the BER of transmission
which constitutes a first cost for transmission. In addition, a RS
extracts a positive utility proportional to the number of packets
relayed Ri. The main driver behind this relaying benefit is that
the importance of the role of a RS i in the network increases
if this RS i serves more RSs and relays more packets, and
thus its utility should also increase. Moreover, for each RS j,
a maintenance cost must be paid for each connection resulting
from a link ij directed from RS i to RS j. In summary, given
a network graph G, for each RS i ∈ V the cost and benefit is
captured by the following utility
Ui(G) = αi ·
(Ti + 1)
|Qi|
·
|Qi|∑
q=1
(1− P eq )
K + βi ·Ri − C(Li), (1)
where P ej is the BER that RS i achieves while transmitting the Ti
data packets and 1 HELLO packet to the BS using the decode-
and-forward model of [3] encompassing all the RSs connecting
i to the BS through the path q ∈ Qi (i divides its packets
equally among all paths) and K is the size of the packets in bits.
Consequently, the term (1−P eq )
K represents the Packet Success
Rate (PSR) of the traffic going through each path q ∈ Qi from i
to the BS. Ri is the number of packets received by i from other
RSs for relaying purposes. C(Li) is a maintenance cost factor
that is an increasing function of the number Li of incident links
from other RSs on RS i. αi and βi are a price per unit of packets
correctly transmitted or relayed; without loss of generality, we
assume αi = βi = 1.
For a transmission between a node V1 ∈ V to a destination
Vn+1 (the destination is always the BS, thus Vn+1 = BS) going
through n−1 intermediate relays {V2, . . . , Vn} ⊂ V , denote Nr
as the set of all receiving terminals, i.e., Nr = {V2 . . . Vn+1}
and Nr(i) as the set of terminals that transmit a signal received
by terminal Vi. For a relay Vi on the path from the source V1
to the destination Vn+1, we have Vr(i) = {V1, . . . , Vi−1}. Given
this notation, the BER between a source RS V1 ∈ V and the
BS destination Vn+1 = BS will be computed along the path
q = {V1, . . . , BS} ∈ QV1 using the tight upper bound given
in [3] for the decoded relaying multi-hop diversity channel with
BPSK modulation as follows
P eq ≤
∑
Ni∈Nr
1
2

 ∑
Nk∈Nr(i)

 ∏
Nj∈Nr(i)
Nj 6=Nk
γk,i
γk,i − γj,i
×
(
1−
√
γk,i
γk,i + 2
)])
. (2)
With γi,j =
Pi·hi,j
σ2
the average received SNR at node j from
node i where Pi is the transmit power of node i, σ
2 the
noise variance and hi,j =
1
d
µ
i,j
is the path loss with di,j the
distance between i and j and µ the path loss exponent. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all the RSs will transmit
with equal power Pi = P˜ , ∀i. Finally, for a RS i which is
connected to the BS through a direct transmission path qd ∈ Qi
with no intermediate hops, the BER can be given by P eqd =
1
2
(
1−
√
γi,BS
2+γi,BS
)
[2], [3]; with γi,BS is the SNR received at
the BS from RS i.
B. Cost
Any well designed maintenance cost function C(Li) for a RS i
must satisfy several requirements that are needed for adequately
modeling the cost for connectivity. For this purpose, we will
inspect the part of the utility which shows the rewards and costs
on a RS i for accepting a connection from other RSs that is
f(Li) = Ri − C(Li).
First, for any RS i, accepting a first link must incur a very low
cost C(Li) and must be feasible for the smallest possible reward
in terms of relayed packets Ri. Thus, we must have f(1) > 0
for the smallest reward Ri = 1, yielding C(1) < 1 (obviously
C(0) = 0), that is a RS i will accept at least one link from other
RSs. Second, each RS i can only support a fixed number of
connections λˆi < λi from other RSs. The maximum number of
connections λi can be configured by the operator in the RSs or
it can have a fixed value based on the physical capabilities of the
RS. As a result, we must have f(λi) = −∞ and thus C(λi) =
+∞. The final requirement is that, as the number Li increases,
C(Li) must start increasing slowly and then must reach a steeper
increase slope. One function satisfying these requirements is the
log barrier function
C(Li) = −ci · log (1− (
Li
λi
)2), (3)
where λi represents the maximum number of connections
whereby C(Li) = +∞; ∀Li ≥ λi and ci represents a pricing
parameter that imposes the minimum relaying benefit required
for adding one link (moving from Li to Li + 1). Similarly to
λi, the pricing parameter ci can be configured in the RSs by
the network operator depending on the requirements in terms of
minimum packet needs for different Li. For a better understand-
ing of the pricing parameter ci consider the rate of increase of
f as we move from Li links to Li + 1 links given by ∆f =
f(Li+1)−f(Li) = (Ri(Li+1)−Ri(Li))+(C(Li)−C(Li+1)),
thus
∆f = ∆Ri − ci · log
[
(1− (Li
λi
)2)
(1− (Li+1
λi
)2)
]
. (4)
The minimum number of packets ∆Ri that a RS i requires
in order to accept an incoming connection is given by setting
∆f > 0 and thus yielding
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Fig. 2. Minimum required number of packets ∆Ri for RS i in order to accept
one additional incoming link (moving from Li to Li + 1) for λi = 5.
∆Ri > ci · log
[
(1− (Li
λi
)2)
(1− (Li+1
λi
)2)
]
. (5)
Through (5) we note that, for a fixed maximum number of RS
connections λi, the pricing parameter ci determines the minimum
required number of packets ∆Ri for different Li. The relation
between ci and ∆Ri is shown in Fig. 2 for λi = 5. For a given
Li, as ci increases the minimum ∆Ri required by RS i increases.
For example, for ci = 10 RS i requires 1 packet only to accept
a first link (Li = 0) but it requires at least 6 packets to accept
a fourth link (Li = 3). Finally, the curve’s rate of increase in
Li satisfies our requirements and is asymptotic to Li = 4 since
λˆi < 5 (adding 1 link from Li = 4 yields an infinite cost).
III. NETWORK FORMATION GAME: PROPERTIES,
STRATEGIES AND DYNAMICS
A. Properties and strategy space of the proposed game
Several properties of the proposed game can be highlighted.
The first property relates to the connectivity of any network graph
G formed using our model as follows.
Property 1: Any network graph G resulting from the pro-
posed network formation game will be a connected graph where
all the relay stations can communicate through the BS.
Proof: First of all, as mentioned in the previous section,
the BS will accept a connection from any RS. Moreover, by
inspecting the utility in (1) we notice that if a RS i is not
connected to the BS through direct transmission or other multi-
hop paths, the BER will be P eq = 1, ∀q ∈ Qi since Qi = ∅ (no
path from the RS i to the BS) and thus the first term in the utility
will be 0 and no RS can improve its utility by disconnecting a
link. In other words, a disconnection by any RS will drastically
decrease its utility. Therefore, any graph G formed using the
proposed game will be a connected graph where all the RSs can
communicate through the BS.
Moreover, due to the high disconnection cost, if a RS is unable
to find any partner willing to accept forming a link with it, it
will connect to the BS through direct transmission. Thus, our
network initially starts with all the RSs connected to the BS,
before engaging in the network formation game.
As expressed in (1) in the case where a relay is connected
to the BS through multiple paths the traffic will be split along
these paths. However, after careful inspection of (1), we have
the following properties
Property 2: In the proposed network formation game, each
RS i will only have one path q0 ∈ Qi to the BS, thus |Qi| = 1 ∀i
and no RS has incentive to form redundant links. As a result,
the utility of a RS i reduces to
Ui(G) = (Ti + 1) · (1− P
e
q0
)L + Ri − C(Li). (6)
Proof: By inspecting the first term in the utility of (1),
we note that each RS i can improve its utility by directing all
of its traffic on the path q0 = {i, i2, . . . , iBS} ∈ Qi exhibiting
the lowest BER. The RS can choose to break all the paths, and
keep only q0, since relaying more packets will not incur extra
costs on the accepting RS i2 because i2 has already paid the
maintenance cost for its connection with i regardless of the traffic
that i will deliver (recall that the maintenance cost C(Li) is a
function of the number of RS links and not the amount of traffic).
Consequently, RS i benefits by delivering all of its packets to
RS i2 which provides the smallest BER. Thus, no RS has any
incentive to form redundant links and it is easily seen that in
this case (1) reduces to (6).
Property 3: Any network graph G resulting from a network
dynamics algorithm applied to our network formation game will
be a connected tree rooted at the BS.
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of properties 1
and 2. As no RS has the incentive to disconnect from the BS nor
to form more than one path to the BS, the final graph resulting
from any network dynamics in our game will be a connected
tree rooted at the BS.
As a result of these properties, every new link established by
a RS i implicitly implies that RS i broke its previous link.
Moreover, any network formation dynamics will converge to a
tree topology as required by the 802.16j standard.
Furthermore, we inspect the possible actions or strategies that
each RS can take in the proposed game. The strategy space of
each RS i consists of the RSs that i wants to connect to (the
links that allow i to improve its BER) as well as the links already
accepted by i (links directed towards i). Therefore, the strategy of
a RS i is to select the link that it wants to form from the available
RSs (or the BS) as well as to select which already accepted links
should be maintained. We note that, a RS i cannot connect to a
RS j which is already connected to i, in the sense that if ji ∈ G,
then ij /∈ G.
Formally, denote Ai = {ji|j ∈ V − {i}} as the set of
links that RS i accepted from other RSs and Bi = {ij|j ∈
(V
⋃
BS)/({i}
⋃
Ai)} as the set of nodes (RSs or the BS)
with whom i wants to connect (note that i cannot connect
to RSs that are already connected to it, i.e., RSs in Ai.). In
consequence, each strategy si of a RS i consists of the pair
si = (ai, bi) ∈ Si = 2
Ai×Bi, where 2
Ai is the set of all subsets
of Ai, ai ∈ 2
Ai are the accepted links that i wants to maintain,
i.e., the links in the set Ai/ai will be broken by RS i and bi ∈ Bi
is the node with whom i wants to be connected. Note that a RS
can only be connected to one other node in our game so selecting
to form a link with bi through strategy si = (ai, bi) implicitly
implies that RS i will replace its previously connected link (if
any) with the new link ibi. Finally, analogous to the terminology
in [12], we refer to all the strategies si ∈ Si as local strategies.
Moreover, forming the directed link ibi through a local strat-
egy si requires the consent of the accepting node bi ∈ Bi.
Therefore, RS i does not have the freedom to choose all the
possible strategies in the strategy space Si and thus the following
definition is required
Definition 2: A local strategy si = (ai, bi) ∈ Si is a feasible
local strategy for a RS i ∈ V if and only if bi is willing to
accept a link from RS i. Denote Fi ⊆ Si as the set of feasible
local strategies.
Denote Gsi,s−i as the graph G formed when RS i plays a
feasible local strategy si ∈ Fi while all other RSs maintain
their vector of strategies s−i = [s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sM ]. We
define the local best response for a RS as follows [12].
Definition 3: A feasible local strategy s∗i ∈ Fi is a local best
response for a RS i ∈ V if Ui(Gs∗i ,s−i) ≥ Ui(Gsi,s−i), ∀si ∈
Fi. Thus, the local best response for a RS i is to make the
selection of links that maximizes its utility given that the other
RSs maintain their vector of strategies.
B. Dynamics of network formation
By using the different properties of the RS network formation
game, we propose a dynamics algorithm that allows a distributed
formation of the network graph. The proposed dynamics assume
that each RS is myopic, in the sense that the RSs aim at
improving their payoff considering only the current state of
the network without taking into account the future evolution of
the network. Several models for myopic dynamics have been
considered in the network formation literature for directed and
undirected graphs [9–12]. In this paper, we propose a myopic
dynamics algorithm inspired from [9] and [12]. The proposed
algorithm is composed of several rounds where each round
mainly consist of two phases: a fair prioritization phase and
a dynamics phase. In the fair prioritization phase, we propose
a priority function that assigns a priority to each RS. In the
dynamics phase, by increasing priority, each RS chooses to play
one of its feasible local strategies.
Therefore, each round of the proposed algorithm begins with
the fair prioritization phase where each RS is assigned a priority
depending on its actual perceived BER: RSs with a higher
BER are assigned a higher priority. The motivation behind this
procedure is to fairly allow RSs that are perceiving a bad channel
to possess an advantage in selecting their partners; for the
purpose of improving their BER. Thus, the RSs experiencing
a high BER can select their partners out of a larger space
of feasible strategies during the dynamics phase. Following
prioritization, the RSs start selecting their strategies sequentially.
For any strategy si = (ai, bi) ∈ Si that RS i intends to choose,
node bi approves to form ibi only if it is able to improve its
utility by either adding ibi or replacing one or more of its already
accepted links in Abi by ibi. Replacing implies that node bi will
break one or more of its already accepted links and replace them
with ibi if this will improve its utility. Taking these conditions
into account, each RS i chooses to play its local best response
s∗i ∈ Fi (which is a feasible strategy) in order to maximize its
utility at each round. In summary, during the dynamics phase,
RSs select their local best responses which maximize the utility
while taking into account the approval of the accepting nodes in
the strategy. Multiple rounds consisting of the above two phases
will be run until convergence to the final tree structure G† where
TABLE I
PROPOSED NETWORK FORMATION DYNAMICS ALGORITHM
Initial State
All the RSs start by directly connecting to the BS.
Two phases in each round of the dynamics
Phase 1 - Fair Prioritization:
Prioritize the RSs from the highest to the lowest current BER.
Phase 2 - Dynamics:
The RSs take action sequentially by priority.
Each RS i plays its local best response s∗
i
= (a∗
i
, b∗
i
) :
a) RS i selects to maintain the subset a∗
i
⊆ Ai of accepted
links, improving its utility by breaking the links in Ai/a
∗
i
.
b) RS i requests to form the link ib∗
i
with node b∗
i
∈ Bi.
b.1) If b∗
i
is a RS, it accepts to form ib∗
i
through add or
replace (s∗
i
is a feasible strategy, see definitions 2 and 3).
i- b∗
i
adds ib∗
i
if doing so improves it utility or
ii- b∗
i
replaces one ore more of its current links with
ib∗
i
if doing so improves it utility.
b.2) If b∗
i
is the BS, it accepts to form ib∗
i
through add.
Multiple rounds are run until convergence to the final local Nash
tree G† where no RS can improve its utility by a unilateral change
of strategy.
the RSs can no longer improve their utility through local best
responses. The proposed algorithm is summarized in Table I.
The stability of the final graph G† is given using the following
concept [12]
Definition 4: A network graph G in which no node i can
improve its utility by a unilateral change in its local feasible
strategy si ∈ Fi is a local Nash network.
Alternatively to the above definition, a local Nash network is a
network where the links chosen by each node are the local best
responses. The local Nash network is thus a network where the
nodes are in a Nash equilibrium with no node able to improve its
utility by unilaterally changing its current local strategy. When
our dynamics converge, we have
Lemma 1: The final tree structure G† resulting from the
proposed dynamics is a local Nash network.
Proof: In each round of the proposed algorithm, each RS
selects the local best response that maximizes its utility in this
round. The proposed algorithm converges when no individual
RS i can improve its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy
si. Thus, at the convergence, the RSs are in a Nash equilibrium
resulting from playing the local best responses and the final tree
structure G† resulting from the proposed dynamics is a local
Nash network.
The proposed algorithm can be implemented in a distributed
manner. For choosing the local best response s∗i = (a
∗
i , b
∗
i ), each
RS can locally assess its current contracts and choose the subset
ai that it wants to maintain while breaking the rest. In addition,
each RS can easily survey neighboring RSs and acquire the BER
that each neighbor can provide. As a result, each RS can take an
individual decision to select the node b∗i that can maximize its
utility; without relying on any centralized entity. The signaling
required for gathering this information can be minimal as each
RS can easily measure its current channel towards the BS and
feed it back to the neighboring RSs. Finally, in order to allow
the RSs to adapt to mobility as well as to the presence of MSs;
the proposed algorithm will periodically run, allowing the RSs
to self-organize and cope with these environmental changes.
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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, we consider a square area of 2 km × 2 km
with the BS at the center. We deploy the RSs and the MSs
within this area. The transmit power is P˜ = 0.01 W, and the
noise level is −110 dBm. The propagation loss is α = 3 and
the packet length is K = 128 bits. The maximum number of
RS connections per RS i is λi = 5, ∀i ∈ V and the pricing
parameter ci = 10, ∀i ∈ V .
In Fig. 3 we randomly deploy M = 10 RSs within the BS
area and all these RSs start by connecting directly to the BS. As
a first step, we run the proposed algorithm prior to the presence
of any MS in the network (the case where each RS has only 1
HELLO packet and Ti = 0 ∀i) and the final local Nash structure
that forms in this step is shown in the figure by the solid arrows
between the RSs. Moreover, through this figure we can clearly
see how the proposed algorithm proceeds before any MS enters
the network. For example, RS 4 connects itself directly to the
BS although it is closer to RS 6. This is due to the fact that
the priority of RS 4 is lower than that of RSs 3 and 7, thus
the bidding turn of RS 4 on the resources of RS 6 follows that
of 3 and 7. As a result, when RS 4 bids to connect to RS 6;
the latter had already accepted two links from RSs 3 and 7 and
will not accept a third unless this third can satisfy the minimum
requirement of 3 packets (Fig. 2). However, RS 4 cannot satisfy
this bid and thus, it remains connected to the BS since it is
unable to find any other alternative to improve its utility. This
example shows how the initial tree forms through our dynamics.
After the initial tree structure is formed, 5 MSs having 5
packets each are randomly deployed as shown in Fig. 3 (each MS
connects to the closest RS). Once this additional traffic enters the
network, the RSs can self-organize and modify the topology in
order to efficiently cope with the incoming traffic. The changes
in the topology are shown with labels (broken links) and dashed
lines (newly formed links) in Fig. 3. For instance, RSs 2 and
4 are able to break their existing connection with the BS and
improve their QoS by connecting to RSs 8 and 6 respectively.
Prior to the presence of the MS traffic on RSs 2 and 4, they
could not satisfy the minimum required packets for connecting
to RSs 8 and 6 respectively. Moreover, we note that RS 3 is
also able to improve its utility by breaking its contract with 6
and connecting to RS 7. In a nutshell, Fig. 3 summarizes the
operation of the proposed dynamics algorithm with and without
the presence of external MS data traffic.
Furthermore, we assess the effect of mobility on the network
structure. We consider the network of Fig. 3 prior to the
deployment of the MSs and we assume that RS 7 is moving
upwards on the positive y-axis while the other RSs remain fixed.
The changes in utility of the concerned RSs during the movement
of RS 7 are shown in Fig. 4. As RS 7 moves upwards; it gets
closer to the BS and starts by improving its utility. As it moves
around 0.3 km; RS 7 distances itself from RS 6 and thus its
utility starts to drop. As it moves around 1 km, RS 7 is able
to improve its utility by disconnecting the link with RS 6 and
connecting to RS 7. We note that when RS 7 splits from 6; the
utility of RS 6 drops while that of RS 1 improves due to the
additional packets for relaying provided by RS 7. Through these
results, the operation of the algorithm in the presence of mobile
RSs is illustrated.
Finally, we inspect the average overall network’s PSR achieved
at the BS by all the MSs. We compare the performance with
the case with no RSs and the case where the RSs are directly
connected to the BS (no tree). We randomly deploy two classes
of MSs with equal probability, a first class representing medium
traffic with 5 packets per MS and a second class representing
heavy traffic with 10 packets per MS. The results are averaged
over random positions of the MSs and the RSs and are shown in
Fig. 5 for different numbers of MSs and RSs. In this figure, as the
number of MSs increases, for all the schemes, the PSR increases
and then stabilizes to a constant maximum. Furthermore, as the
number of RSs increases, the performance advantage of our
algorithm, in terms of PSR, increases significantly at all network
loads. The proposed algorithm presents, respectively, an overall
PSR improvement up to 17.5% and 15.6% over the schemes
without RSs and with direct RS-BS connection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a novel distributed approach to the
uplink tree formation problem in 802.16j networks through a
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network formation game model. In the proposed game, the RSs
engage in pairwise negotiations for forming directed links that
result in a final tree structure rooted at the BS. The proposed
model accounts for the PSR gains from cooperative decode-and-
forward transmission as well as the costs for link maintenance.
For modeling the interactions between the RSs, a distributed
myopic dynamics algorithm is derived. The algorithm enables
the RSs to maximize their utility while forming a local Nash
network. Through simulations, we showed how the RSs are
able to autonomously self-organize, adapting the topology to
environment changes due to mobility and heterogeneous traffic
while improving the overall network’s PSR.
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